mirror of
https://github.com/amigan/aim-oscar-server.git
synced 2024-11-22 04:29:47 -05:00
248 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
248 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
package services
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/md5"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base32"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"aim-oscar/models"
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"aim-oscar/oscar"
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"aim-oscar/util"
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"github.com/pkg/errors"
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"github.com/uptrace/bun"
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)
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const CIPHER_LENGTH = 64
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const AIM_MD5_STRING = "AOL Instant Messenger (SM)"
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var ROAST = [16]byte{0xF3, 0x26, 0x81, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x92, 0x71, 0xA3, 0xB9, 0xE6, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x95, 0x7C}
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func roast(password string) []byte {
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ret := make([]byte, 0)
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for i, letter := range password {
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ret = append(ret, byte(letter)^ROAST[i%16])
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}
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return ret
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}
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type AuthorizationCookie struct {
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UIN int64
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X string
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}
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type AuthorizationRegistrationService struct {
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BOSAddress string
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}
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func AuthenticateFLAPCookie(ctx context.Context, db *bun.DB, flap *oscar.FLAP) (*models.User, error) {
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// Otherwise this is a protocol negotiation from the client. They're likely trying to connect
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// and sending a cookie to verify who they are.
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tlvs, err := oscar.UnmarshalTLVs(flap.Data.Bytes()[4:])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "authentication request missing TLVs")
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}
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/*
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There are 2 ways that clients authenticate: channel 1 auth w/ roasted password, or via MD5 hash. The
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former is used by the 1.0 client, whereas the second is used by 3.5 and up (I believe).
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*/
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// This is channel 1 auth
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screenNameTLV := oscar.FindTLV(tlvs, 0x1)
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roastedPWTLV := oscar.FindTLV(tlvs, 0x2)
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if screenNameTLV != nil && roastedPWTLV != nil {
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user, err := models.UserByScreenName(ctx, db, string(screenNameTLV.Data))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not get User by UIN")
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(roastedPWTLV.Data, roast(user.Password)) {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid password")
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}
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return user, nil
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}
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// This is MD5 hash auth
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cookieTLV := oscar.FindTLV(tlvs, 0x6)
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if cookieTLV == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("authentication request missing Cookie TLV 0x6")
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}
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auth := AuthorizationCookie{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(cookieTLV.Data, &auth); err != nil {
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return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not unmarshal cookie")
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}
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user, err := models.UserByUIN(ctx, db, auth.UIN)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "could not get User by UIN")
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}
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h := md5.New()
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io.WriteString(h, user.Cipher)
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io.WriteString(h, user.Password)
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io.WriteString(h, AIM_MD5_STRING)
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expectedPasswordHash := fmt.Sprintf("%x", h.Sum(nil))
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// Make sure the hash passed in matches the one from the DB
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if expectedPasswordHash != auth.X {
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return nil, errors.New("unexpected cookie hash")
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}
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return user, nil
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}
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func (a *AuthorizationRegistrationService) GenerateCipher() string {
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randomBytes := make([]byte, 64)
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_, err := rand.Read(randomBytes)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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return base32.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes)[:CIPHER_LENGTH]
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}
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func (a *AuthorizationRegistrationService) HandleSNAC(ctx context.Context, db *bun.DB, snac *oscar.SNAC) (context.Context, error) {
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session, err := oscar.SessionFromContext(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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util.PanicIfError(err)
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}
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switch snac.Header.Subtype {
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// Request MD5 Auth Key
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case 0x06:
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tlvs, err := oscar.UnmarshalTLVs(snac.Data.Bytes())
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util.PanicIfError(err)
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screenNameTLV := oscar.FindTLV(tlvs, 1)
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if screenNameTLV == nil {
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return ctx, errors.New("missing screen_name TLV")
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}
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// Fetch the user
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user, err := models.UserByScreenName(ctx, db, string(screenNameTLV.Data))
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if err != nil {
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return ctx, err
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}
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if user == nil {
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snac := oscar.NewSNAC(0x17, 0x03)
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snac.Data.WriteBinary(screenNameTLV)
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snac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x08, []byte{0, 4}))
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resp := oscar.NewFLAP(2)
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resp.Data.WriteBinary(snac)
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return ctx, session.Send(resp)
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}
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// Create cipher for this user
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user.Cipher = a.GenerateCipher()
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if err = user.Update(ctx, db); err != nil {
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return ctx, err
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}
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snac := oscar.NewSNAC(0x17, 0x07)
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snac.Data.WriteUint16(uint16(len(user.Cipher)))
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snac.Data.WriteString(user.Cipher)
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resp := oscar.NewFLAP(2)
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resp.Data.WriteBinary(snac)
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return ctx, session.Send(resp)
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// Client Authorization Request
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case 0x02:
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tlvs, err := oscar.UnmarshalTLVs(snac.Data.Bytes())
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util.PanicIfError(err)
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screenNameTLV := oscar.FindTLV(tlvs, 1)
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if screenNameTLV == nil {
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return ctx, errors.New("missing screen_name TLV 0x1")
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}
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screen_name := string(screenNameTLV.Data)
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ctx := context.Background()
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user, err := models.UserByScreenName(ctx, db, screen_name)
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if err != nil {
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return ctx, err
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}
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if user == nil {
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snac := oscar.NewSNAC(0x17, 0x03)
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snac.Data.WriteBinary(screenNameTLV)
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snac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x08, []byte{0, 4}))
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resp := oscar.NewFLAP(2)
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resp.Data.WriteBinary(snac)
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return ctx, session.Send(resp)
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}
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passwordHashTLV := oscar.FindTLV(tlvs, 0x25)
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if passwordHashTLV == nil {
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return ctx, errors.New("missing password hash TLV 0x25")
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}
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// Compute password has that we expect the client to send back if the password was right
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h := md5.New()
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io.WriteString(h, user.Cipher)
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io.WriteString(h, user.Password)
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io.WriteString(h, AIM_MD5_STRING)
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expectedPasswordHash := h.Sum(nil)
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if !bytes.Equal(expectedPasswordHash, passwordHashTLV.Data) {
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// Tell the client this was a bad password
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badPasswordSnac := oscar.NewSNAC(0x17, 0x03)
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badPasswordSnac.Data.WriteBinary(screenNameTLV)
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badPasswordSnac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x08, []byte{0, 4})) // incorrect nick/pass
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badPasswordFlap := oscar.NewFLAP(2)
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badPasswordFlap.Data.WriteBinary(badPasswordSnac)
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session.Send(badPasswordFlap)
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// Tell them to leave
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discoFlap := oscar.NewFLAP(4)
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return ctx, session.Send(discoFlap)
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}
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// Only users that have verified their email can use the service
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if !user.Verified || user.DeletedAt != nil {
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// Tell the client this was a bad password
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badPasswordSnac := oscar.NewSNAC(0x17, 0x03)
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badPasswordSnac.Data.WriteBinary(screenNameTLV)
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badPasswordSnac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x08, []byte{0, 7})) // invalid account
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badPasswordSnac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x04, []byte("http://runningman.network/errors/unverified-account")))
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badPasswordFlap := oscar.NewFLAP(2)
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badPasswordFlap.Data.WriteBinary(badPasswordSnac)
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session.Send(badPasswordFlap)
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// Tell them to leave
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discoFlap := oscar.NewFLAP(4)
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return ctx, session.Send(discoFlap)
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}
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// Send BOS response + cookie
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authSnac := oscar.NewSNAC(0x17, 0x3)
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authSnac.Data.WriteBinary(screenNameTLV)
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authSnac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x5, []byte(a.BOSAddress)))
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cookie, err := json.Marshal(AuthorizationCookie{
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UIN: user.UIN,
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X: fmt.Sprintf("%x", expectedPasswordHash),
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})
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util.PanicIfError(err)
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authSnac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x6, cookie))
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authSnac.Data.WriteBinary(oscar.NewTLV(0x11, []byte(user.Email)))
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authFlap := oscar.NewFLAP(2)
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authFlap.Data.WriteBinary(authSnac)
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session.Send(authFlap)
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// Tell them to leave
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discoFlap := oscar.NewFLAP(4)
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session.Send(discoFlap)
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return ctx, session.Disconnect()
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}
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return ctx, nil
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}
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